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Abstract
This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct policy opti-
mally while having imperfect credibility and harboring doubts about its model. Taking
the Smets-Wouters model as the central banks approximating model, the papers main
ndings are as follows. First, a central banks credibility can have large consequences
for how policy responds to shocks. Second, central banks that have low credibility can
benet from a desire for robustness because this desire motivates the central bank to follow
through on policy announcements that would otherwise not be time-consistent. Third,
even relatively small departures from perfect credibility can produce important declines in
policy performance. Finally, as a technical contribution, the paper develops a numerical
procedure to solve the decision-problem facing an imperfectly credible policymaker that
seeks robustness.
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1 Introduction
On August 9, 2011, against a background of heightened volatility in global nancial markets,
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve issued a monetary policy statement that read
The Committee currently anticipates that economic conditionsincluding low rates of resource
utilization and a subdued outlook for ination over the medium runare likely to warrant excep-
tionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013. This passage replaced
the language in statements issued since December 16, 2008, which said The Committee con-
tinues to anticipate that economic conditionsincluding low rates of resource utilization and
a subdued outlook for ination over the medium runare likely to warrant exceptionally low
levels for the federal funds rate for an extended period. Similar passages can be found in
more recent statements. Although the precise language has changed, each passage is notable
for presenting households, rms, and investors with forward-guidance about monetary policy,
guidance provided in an e¤ort to leverage credibility in order to stimulate current economic
activity. The passages are also notable in that the forward guidance is conditioned on a
forecast for ination and resource utilization, or slack. As a consequence, the e¤ectiveness of
the forward-guidance hinges on the Federal Reserves credibility and on the potential for the
forecasting model to be misspecied.
We consider the decision problem facing an imperfectly-credible central bank that seeks
robustness to model uncertainty and explore the following questions. How important is
credibility for monetary policy and macroeconomic outcomes? Does a central banks desire
for robustness help or hinder policymaking? How do imperfect credibility and robustness
a¤ect the forward-guidance that central banks provide? The answers to these questions are
important when central banks are relying increasingly on their credibility and on forward-
guidance to gain leverage over current economic outcomes, all-the-while model uncertainty
remains an ongoing concern.
To model credibility, we adopt the quasi-commitment approach developed by Roberds
(1987), Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), and Debortoli and Nunes (2010). According to
this literature a policymakers credibility is associated with the probability that the promises
it makes about future policy will be honored. Policymakers that have no credibility honor
their promises with probability zero and conduct discretionary policy. Policymakers that
have imperfect credibility honor their promises with probabilities between zero and one, with
higher probabilities indicating higher credibility and a probability of one indicating commit-
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ment. Central banks desire higher levels of credibility because a lack of credibility leads to a
(time-consistent) equilibrium characterized by a discretionary ination bias and/or a discre-
tionary stabilization bias. Under the former, the central bank, faced with the goals of keeping
unemployment close to the natural rate and ination close to target, succumbs to a short-run
incentive to create surprise ination with permanently higher ination and no reduction in
the unemployment rate the equilibrium outcome (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). Under the
latter, the central bank, seeking to stabilize output and ination e¢ ciently in response to
supply shocks, has an incentive to promise future policy interventions that mitigate the size
of todays policy intervention, without having an incentive to subsequently deliver on those
promises (Svensson, 1997; Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999). The ine¢ ciencies associated
with both biases are overcome when credibility is perfect.
In addition to imperfect credibility, the central bank that we study is concerned about
model misspecication. To model the central banks concern for model misspecication we
adopt the robust control approach advanced by Hansen and Sargent (2008). According to the
robust control literature, a policymaker that desires robustness against model misspecication
will formulate policy in the context of a potentially distorted, or misspecied, approximating
model so as to guard against the worst permissible misspecication. Through this mechanism
the policymaker is able to conduct model-based policy while also expressing distrust in its
model.
After developing the decision problem confronting an imperfectly credibility policymaker
that seeks robustness to model uncertainty and presenting its solution, we use the Smets
and Wouters (2007) model to examine the e¤ects that imperfect credibility and robustness
have on optimal policymaking. We employ the Smets and Wouters (2007) model for our
analysis because it is widely understood, it forms the basis for many other models, and it
is thought to t U.S. data well; in these respects it can usefully be viewed as the central
banks approximating model. Moreover, the Smets-Wouters model contains a broad array of
shocks whose presence provides ample cover for model misspecication and it is forward-looking
allowing policy announcements and central bank credibility to potentially play important roles.
A further advantage to using the Smets-Wouters model is that our qualitative ndings are likely
to generalize to the many related models.
The main lessons that emerge are the following. First, a central banks credibility gives
it a powerful lever for managing private-sector expectations and for stabilizing the economy.
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Second, when a central bank has low credibility the economy can benet from the central
banks desire for robustness. Put di¤erently, the central banks desire for robustness can act
somewhat as a substitute for credibility when credibility is low. This result emerges because
a robust central bank is directed to respond aggressively to stabilize ination following shocks,
pursuing a policy that would ordinarily be infeasible for a central bank that lacks credibility.
Third, even relatively small departures from perfect credibility produce big declines in policy
performance, giving rise to a form of discretionary stabilization bias. The over-riding lesson
that emerges from this analysis is that credibility is extremely valuable for central banks, both
when the model is known to be correctly specied and when it is suspected that it is not.
In addition to the work of Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), Debortoli and Nunes (2010),
and Hansen and Sargent (2008), this paper is related to Bodenstein, Hebden, and Nunes
(2010) and Kasa (2002). However, where Bodenstein, Hebden, and Nunes (2010) focus on
the interaction between imperfect credibility and the zero-bound on nominal interest rates, we
focus on the interaction between imperfect credibility and model uncertainty. Nonetheless,
our results are consistent with theirs in-so-much as we too nd that policymakers tend to
make more extreme policy announcements as their credibility declines. Like ourselves, Kasa
(2002) uses robust control to analyze the e¤ects of model uncertainty on policy design in a
model where private agents are forward-looking. But unlike ourselves, Kasa (2002) analyzes
use frequency domain methods to analyze the robustness of a simple stylized New Keynesian
model and looks at commitment from a timeless perspective (Woodford, 1999).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the decision
problem facing a central bank that seeks to guard against model misspecication while endowed
with imperfect credibility. Section 3 establishes the connection between robust control and
risk-sensitive preferences for this class of quasi-commitment decision problems. Section 4
summarizes and analyzes the Smets-Wouters model that serves as our laboratory for analysis.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Robustness and imperfect credibility
In this section we describe a linear-quadratic planning problem and characterize its solution.
This planning problem involves constraints that contain non-predetermined variables and is
related to the commitment problems that are solved routinely in the monetary policy literature,
while di¤ering in two important respects. First, the decisionmaking environment is one in
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which the policymaker has imperfect credibility. Imperfect credibility is modeled according
to the quasi-commitment literature which allows the policymaker to stochastically default,
reoptimizing its plan at stochastic intervals. In this aspect, the analysis builds on work
by Roberds (1987), Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), and Debortoli and Nunes (2010).
Second, the decisionmaking environment is one in which the policymaker has doubts about its
model and seeks a policy that is robust in the sense of Hansen and Sargent (2008). In this
aspect, the analysis is related to work by Giordani and Söderlind (2004), Hansen and Sargent
(2008, chapter 16), and Dennis (2008, 2010).
The two key parameters in the decision problem that we formulate are  2 [0; 1], which
governs the policymakers credibility, and  2 [;1), which governs the policymakers distrust
in its model. Importantly, many standard decisionmaking problems emerge as special cases
of this decision problem. Specically, for di¤erent limiting values of  and  the decision
problem simplies to nonrobust commitment ( " 1,  " 1), nonrobust discretion ( " 1,
 # 0), robust commitment ( " 1j 2 [;1)), robust discretion ( # 0j 2 [;1)), and
quasi-commitment ( " 1j 2 [0; 1]).
2.1 The approximating model
The economy consists of households, rms, and a policymaker, which in our application is
a central bank. All agents are assumed to share an approximating model that they believe
comes closest to describing the process governing economic outcomes. According to this ap-
proximating model, an n1 vector of endogenous variables, zt, consisting of n1 predetermined
variables, xt, and n2 (n2 = n n1) nonpredetermined variables, yt, evolves over time according
to
xt+1 = A11xt + A12yt + B1ut + C1"xt+1; (1)
A0Etyt+1 = A21xt + A22yt + B2ut; (2)
where ut is a p  1 vector of policy control variables and "xt  i:i:d: [0; I] is an n"  1
(n"  n1) vector of white-noise innovations. The matrices A11, A12, A21, A22, B1, and B2
are conformable with xt, yt, and ut as necessary while the matrix C1 is constructed to ensure
that "xt has the identity matrix as its variance-covariance matrix. The operator Et represents
the private sectors mathematical expectation operator conditional upon period t information.
Equation (2) accommodates a leading matrix A0 that need not have full rank.
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Equations (1) and (2) are standard constraints in linear-quadratic decision problems in
which private agents are forward-looking and policy is conducted under either commitment or
discretion (Currie and Levine, 1993) or under timeless-perspective commitment (Woodford,
2010; Svensson, 2010). Of course, when policy is conducted under discretion equations (1)
and (2) must be augmented with an equation of the form
Etyt+1 = HEtxt+1; (3)
where H is determined in equilibrium, to account to the fact that private-sector expectations
depend only on the state variables in a Markov-perfect (and hence time-consistent) equilibrium
(Kydland and Prescott, 1977).
2.1.1 Introducing imperfect credibility
Building on Roberds (1987), Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debortoli and Nunes
(2010) analyze decision problems in rational expectations models that are characterized by
what they call quasi-commitment. Quasi-commitment provides a workable approach to
modeling imperfect credibility because it allows a separation between what policymakers say
they are going to do and what they end up doing.
Quasi-commitment views commitment and discretion as opposite ends of a unit-continuum
of decision-problems. Each decision-problem on the unit-continuum is indexed by  2 [0; 1],
where  denotes the mean of the random variable t, which obeys a Bernoulli distribution.
The underlying environment can be interpreted several ways. One interpretation is that
the environment is one in which the policymaker makes announcements about future policy
with all agents (including the policymaker) making decisions knowing that the announced
policy will only be implemented with probability . An alternative interpretation is that
the environment is one in which policymakers can credibly commit to a state-contingent plan,
or policy, for the duration of their tenure, but where each policymakers tenure is uncertain,
governed by the outcome of a sequence of i:i:d: draws of the random variable t. Accordingly,
if t = 1, then the incumbent-policymakers tenure continues in period t, whereas if t = 0,
then the incumbent-policymakers tenure ends at the beginning of period t. In the event
that the incumbent-policymakers tenure ends, that policymaker is replaced by another with
identical preferences, but that is not beholden to honor the policies announced by any of
its predecessors. Under either interpretation,  = 1 corresponds to commitment,  = 0
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corresponds to discretion, and  2 (0; 1) corresponds to a form of limited commitment or
imperfect credibility.
At the start of every period a draw for t is received and is observed by all agents. In form-
ing their period-t expectations of yt+1, therefore, private agents take into account uncertainty
about the shocks hitting the economy and uncertainty about whether the incumbent or a new
policymaker will be conducting policy in period t + 1. Assuming that the Bernoulli distrib-
ution that governs t is independent of the probability density that governs the innovations,
"xt, equation (2) can be written as
A0Etyt+1 = A0Et

yt+1j
 
t+1 = 1

+ (1  ) A0Et

yt+1j
 
t+1 = 0

; (4)
where the expectation Et
 
yt+1jt+1 = 0

is governed by an expression that takes the form of
equation (3).
2.1.2 Introducing model uncertainty
Following Hansen and Sargent (2008), the policymaker does not fully trust the approximating
model, fearing that it may be misspecied. Although it fears that its approximating model
is misspecied, the policymaker believes that private agents know the correct model. Thus
the robust decision problem formulated below follows Hansen and Sargents (2012) rst type
of ambiguity.
To accommodate the policymakers concerns, distortions, or specication errors, vt+1, are
introduced, disguised by the innovations, "xt+1. A consequence of the specication errors is
that equation (1) in the approximating model becomes
xt+1 = A11xt + A12yt + B1ut + C1 (vt+1 + "xt+1) ; (5)
in the distortedmodel and that equation (2) in the approximating model becomes
A0yt+1j
 
t+1 = 1

= [A21   (1  ) A0HA11] xt + [A22   (1  ) A0HA12] yt
+ [B2   (1  ) A0HB1] ut + A0C2 (vt+1 + "xt+1) ; (6)
in the distorted model, where H and C2 have yet to be determined. In equation (6), H char-
acterizes the relationship between the non-predetermined variables, yt, and the predetermined
variables, xt, in the event that a reoptimization occurs (t = 0) whileC2 summarizes how errors
in forecasting the non-predetermined variables (i.e. yt+1j
 
t+1 = 1
 Et yt+1j  t+1 = 1)
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are related to the innovations, "xt+1. More compactly, and in obvious notation, equation (6)
can be written as
D0yt+1j
 
t+1 = 1

= D1xt + D2yt + D3ut + D4vt+1 + D4"xt+1: (7)
The sequence of specication errors, fvs+1g1s=t is constrained to satisfy the boundedness
condition
E
1X
s=t
(s t)v
0
s+1vs+1  !; (8)
where ! 2 [0; !]. It is the satisfaction of this boundedness condition that denes the sense
in which the approximating model, summarized by equations (1) (2), is a good one. When
! = 0, the policymaker trusts the approximating model and conducts policy as if the approxi-
mating model is correct. As ! increases, however, the policymaker increasingly suspects that
the approximating model is misspecied. For ! > !, the policymakers doubts about the
approximating model are such that it no longer views the approximating model to be a good
representation of the data-generating process.
2.2 The robust decision problem with imperfect credibility
The policymakers objective function is given by the loss function
E
1X
s=t
(s t)L (xs;ys;us) ; (9)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and L (xs;ys;us) is quadratic and convex to the origin.
As noted earlier, in the event that t = 1, the incumbent policymakers tenure continues.
However, in the event that t = 0, the period-t decision problem for the newly-appointed
policymaker is to choose fusg1s=t to minimize and fvs+1g1s=t to maximize equation (9) subject
to equations (5), (7), and (8), and xt known. According to this decision problem, to guard
against the specication errors that it fears, the robust policymaker formulates policy subject
to the distorted model with the mind-set that the specication errors will be as damaging
as possible, a view operationalized via the metaphor that fvs+1g1s=t is chosen by a ctitious
evil agent whose objectives are diametrically opposed to those of the policymaker. Follow-
ing Hansen and Sargent (2008), this constraint problem can be replaced with an equivalent
multiplier problem, in which
E
1X
s=t
(s t)
h
L (xs;ys;us)  v0s+1vs+1
i
; (10)
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 2 [;1), is maximized with respect to fvs+1g1s=t and minimized with respect to fusg1s=t,
subject to equations (5) and (7), and xt known. The multiplier, or robustness parameter, ,
represents the shadow price of a marginal relaxation in the boundedness condition, equation
(8). Larger values for , which correspond to smaller values of !, signify greater condence
in the adequacy of the approximating model. Of course, in the limit as  " 1, the nonrobust
decision problem is restored.
From the Lagrange function
t = E
1X
s=t
(s t)
24 L (xs;ys;us)  v0s+1vs+1 20s  D1xs + D2ys + D3us + D4vs+1 + D5"xs+1  D0ys+1j  s+1 = 1
 20s (A11xs + A12ys + B1us + C1 (vs+1 + "xs+1)  xs+1)
35 ;
(11)
we construct the dualloss function
eL (xs;s 1;ys;us;s;vs+1) = L (xs;ys;us)  v0s+1vs+1
 2 0s (D1xs + D2ys + D3us + D4vs+1 + D5"xs+1)
+2
0
s 1D0ys; (12)
where s = s, allowing equation (11) to be expressed as
t = E
1X
s=t
(s t)
" eL (xs;s 1;ys;us;s;vs+1)
 20s (A11xs + A12ys + B1us + C1 (vs+1 + "xs+1)  xs+1)
#
: (13)
Now dening eXt =  x0t 0t 1 0 and eut =  y0t u0t  0t 0 and employing Marcet and Mari-
mons recursive saddle-point theorem (Marcet and Marimon, 2009), the robust decision prob-
lem for the newly-appointed policymaker can be expressed in terms of the Bellman equation
eX0tV eXt + d = max
(t)
min
(yt;ut)
max
(vt+1)
heLeXt; eut;vt+1+ Et eX0t+1 eV eXt+1 + di ; (14)
in which eV = V + (1  ) S0S0 1VS 1S; (15)
with S =

I 0

(and S 1 representing the generalized left inverse of S), subject to
eXt+1 = eAeXt + eBeut + eCvt+1 + eC"xt+1: (16)
In equation (16), the system matrices are given by eA =  A11 0
0 0

, eB =  A12 B1 0
0 0 I

,
and eC =  C1
0

.
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The decision problem described by equations (14) (16) is essentially an optimal linear
regulator problem that can be solved using standard methods. From its solution it is straight-
forward to recover updated terms for H and C2. Beginning with conjectured values for H and
C2, iterating to convergence delivers the worst-case decision rules and the worst-case equilib-
rium law-of-motion.1 With the worst-case equilibrium in hand, it is straightforward to recover
the approximating equilibrium. In the approximating equilibrium, although the policymaker
employs its robust decision rule, the approximating model is taken to be correctly specied.
The approximating equilibrium gives us an equilibrium law-of-motion
eXt+1 = eA + eBF eXt + eC"xt+1; (17)
and a collection of decision rules eut = FeXt: (18)
Notice that the worst-case equilibrium and the approximating equilibrium are both ex-
pressed in terms of a state vector that includes the multipliers, t 1. Accordingly, in the
event that t = 0 the approximating equilibrium is governed by equations (17) (18), but with
t 1 = 0.
3 A risk-sensitive formulation
For linear-quadratic innite-horizon discounted stochastic models in which the constraints do
not contain nonpredetermined variables, Hansen and Sargent (2008, chapter 2) show that
the decision rule that solves the robust control problem also solves an alternative innite-
horizon discounted stochastic decision problem in which the policymaker does not fear model
misspecication, but instead has risk-sensitive preferences (Whittle, 1990). We extend that
result to models whose constraints do contain nonpredetermined variables, focusing here on
the case where policy is conducted with discretion. The general case where the constraints
contain nonpredetermined variables and policy is conducted with quasi-commitment is treated
in Appendix A.
The connection between the robust control formulation and the risk-sensitive preferences
formulation is useful for several reasons. It links the robust control problem to ambigu-
ity/uncertainty aversion and o¤ers a more general interpretation of the decision problem as a
1This solution procedure has worked well when applied to the Smets-Wouters model and to other models,
converging rapidly and without di¢ culty.
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consequence. Specically, the policymakers doubts about the model lead to behavior that
can equivalently be generated by additional sensitivity to risk (Whittle, 1990), Epstein-Zin-
preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989), or ambiguity aversion (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989).
With policy conducted under pure discretion ( = 0), it follows from equation (6) that the
aggregate reaction function for the nonpredetermined variables can be written as
yt = Jxt + Kut; (19)
where
J = [A22  A0HA12] 1 [A0HA11  A21] ;
K = [A22  A0HA12] 1 [A0HB1  B2] :
Equation (19) applies under both the approximating model and the distorted model. Given
equation (19), the law-of-motion for the predetermined variables in the approximating model
and in the distorted model are
xt+1 = [A11 + A12J] xt + [B1 + A12K] ut + C1"xt+1; (20)
and
xt+1 = [A11 + A12J] xt + [B1 + A12K] ut + C1 (vt+1 + "xt+1) ; (21)
respectively.
The risk-sensitive formulation employs equation (20) (because the policymaker trusts the
model), and leads to the Bellman-equation
x
0
tVxt + d = minut

L (xt;Jxt + Kut;ut)  1

ln

Et

exp



x
0
t+1Vxt+1 + d

; (22)
where the risk-sensitivity parameter satises   0 andV is positive semi-denite. Employing
a result from Jacobson (1973), equation (22) is equivalent to
x
0
tVxt + d = minut
h
L (xt;Jxt + Kut;ut) + Et

x
0
t+1D (V) xt+1 +
bdi ; (23)
where
D (V) = V   VC1

I + C
0
1VC1
 1
C
0
1V:
In contrast, the robust-control formulation employs equation (21) (because the policymaker
distrusts the model), and leads to the Bellman-equation
x
0
tVxt + d = minut
max
vt+1
h
L (xt;Jxt + Kut;ut)  v0t+1vt+1 + Et

x
0
t+1Vx

t+1 + d
i
: (24)
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Performing the inner-maximization gives
vt+1 =
1

Et
"
I  1

C
0
1VC1
 1
C
0
1Vxt+1
#
: (25)
Substituting equations (25) and (21) into equation (24) results in
x
0
tVxt + d = minut
24 L (xt;Jxt + Kut;ut)
+Et

x
0
t+1

V + 1VC1

I  1C
0
1VC1
 1
C
0
1V

xt+1 + d
 35 ; (26)
which, aside from the di¤erence between bd and d (which does not a¤ect the decision rules),
is equivalent to equation (23) with  =   1. Importantly, it is the approximating model,
equation (20), that constrains equation (26).
The treatment above parallels Hansen and Sargents (2008, chapter 2) treatment of the
optimal linear regulator problem. The two problems are related because the aggregate reaction
function (equation 19) allows the nonpredetermined variables to be eliminated from the system
leading to a recursive problem in which the state variables are given by xt. The connection
between equation (26) and Epstein-Zin-preferences comes from the fact that risk-sensitive
preferences are a special case of Epstein-Zin preferences. Finally, the connection between
equation (26) and ambiguity/uncertainty aversion follows from Hansen and Sargent (2007).
4 The model in summary
To examine robust policymaking with imperfect credibility we use as our approximating model
the Smets and Wouters (2007) model for the U.S. We use this model for several reasons.
First, the model has been found to provide a reasonably good description of U.S. economic
outcomes. Second, the model forms the basis for many related models and its widespread
usage, together with its empirical support, make it a sensible choice. Third, the models
structure accommodates many shocks, which from the robust control perspective, represent
sources of potential misspecication. Fourth, private agents are forward-looking, allowing
central-bank credibility to inuence private-sector decisionmaking.
Because the Smets and Wouters (2007) model is widely known, we describe only its main
characteristics here and refer interested readers to the original text. The economy is populated
by three types of agents: households, rms, and a central bank. Households own the capital
stock and the equity in rms and receive income from dividends and from renting capital
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and supplying labor to rms. Households use their income to purchase goods that they
allocate between consumption and investment in order to maximize expected lifetime utility.
Goods allocated to investment augment the capital stock, subject to a resource cost associated
with changing the investment-ow. Households gain utility from consumption (subject to
an external consumption habit) and from leisure, and they are monopolistically competitive
suppliers of their labor, setting their wage subject to a Calvo-style wage rigidity. Those
households that are unable to change their wage in a given period are assumed to index
their wage to lagged aggregate ination. On the production side, rms are monopolistically
competitive; they rent capital and hire labor and produce according to a constant-returns
Cobb-Douglas production function. Firms choose how much capital and labor to employ and
set prices in order to maximize the expected present discounted value of the rm, subject to
a Calvo (1983) price rigidity and price indexation. Prots are returned to households in the
form of a lump-sum dividend. Finally, the goods that rms produce are combined according
to a Kimball (1995) technology to produce a nal good that is sold to households in a perfectly
competitive market.
Although Smets and Wouters (2007) characterize monetary policy in terms of an estimated
Taylor-type rule, our focus is on optimal policymaking. Accordingly, we take the primal
approach and replace their estimated policy rule with one chosen in order to minimize the
following loss function
L (xt;yt;ut) = 
2
t + 

yt   yft
2
; (27)
where t denotes annualized quarterly ination, yt denotes output, y
f
t denotes ex-price out-
put, and yt   yft denotes the output gap. The parameter  2 [0;1) governs the weight
assigned to stabilizing the output gap relative to stabilizing ination. The model is log-
linearized about a zero-ination balanced growth path and is subject to six shocks, including
those to the aggregate production technology, the investment-specic production technology,
and to the price and wage markups. These six shocks obscure potential specication errors.
We parameterize the model using the coe¢ cient estimates provided by the posterior mean
(Smets and Wouters, 2007, Tables 1A and 1B) and choose  = 0:25 as a benchmark value.
5 How large is the discretionary stabilization bias?
Before looking at the e¤ects that imperfect credibility have on the model, we rst quantify the
magnitude of the stabilization bias for di¤erent values of . Following Dennis and Söderström
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(2006), we quantify the stabilization bias by calculating the percent gain in loss associated
with having a commitment technology, which is given by

 = 100

1  V
c
V d

; (28)
where V c and V d represent losses under commitment and discretion, respectively, and by
calculating the ination equivalent (Jensen, 2002; Dennis and Söderström, 2006), which is
given by b = pV d   V c: (29)
The interpretation of 
, the percent gain in loss associated with commitment is straight-
forward. However, as a measure of stabilization bias it su¤ers from the problem that where
the losses under commitment and discretion are both small, large percentage gains can be
attributed to commitment although the absolute di¤erence in losses is small. The ination
equivalent measures the amount by which the central bank could permanently miss its ination
target under commitment and still be no worse than discretion.
Table 1: Stabilization Bias in Smets and Wouters (2007)
 V c V d % Gain from commitment Ination equivalent
0:25 3:105 12:277 74:713 3:029
0:50 4:441 13:175 66:294 2:955
1:00 6:077 13:676 55:564 2:757
2:00 7:983 13:941 42:736 2:441
4:00 10:180 14:078 27:691 1:974
Table 1 displays the losses under commitment and discretion, the percent gain from com-
mitment, and the ination equivalent for a range of values for . Importantly, for all values
of  considered both the percent gain from commitment and the ination equivalent are large,
signalling that the absence of commitment, by leading to a discretionary stabilization bias,
has large e¤ects in the model. With  equal to 0:25, the central bank could miss its in-
ation target by a full three percentage points under commitment and this outcome still be
preferred to a discretionary equilibrium in which the ination target is hit on average. The
nding that stabilization bias is large in this model is consistent with Dennis and Söderström
(2006), who showed that the discretionary stabilization bias tends to be larger in models that
lack transmission lags and in which expectations are formed using period-t information, both
characteristics of the Smets-Wouters model.
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To relate this analysis back to Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), Figure 1 displays the
relationship between the average regime duration, (1  ) 1 and the gain to credibility that
remains, where the latter is measured by
 () =
V qc ()  V c
V d   V c :
When  = 0, V qc (0) = V d and  (0) = 1. Then, as  increases and approaches 1, expected
loss with quasi-commitment, V qc (), approaches expected loss with commitment, V c, and
 () approaches 0. For any given level of ,  () reports how much of the gap between
discretion and commitment remains to be closed through higher credibility.
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Figure 1. Expected additional gain to credibility as a function of credibility
In contrast Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), Figure 1 shows for the Smets-Wouters
model that when the average regime duration is short most of the gains to increased credibility
remain. Indeed, where Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) nd for their model2 that an
average duration of just 10 quarters leaves only about 5 percent of the gains to commitment
2The model that Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) analyze is a simple stylized New Keynesian model
consisting of the New Keynesian Phillips curve with i.i.d. markup shocks in which the output gap is the policy
instrument.
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outstanding, for the Smets-Wouters model Figure 1 shows that a similar performance requires
an average regime duration of about 25 quarters.
6 Robust policymaking with imperfect credibility
Where the analysis in Section 5 focused on the polar cases of commitment and discretion,
we now turn to consider the e¤ects of imperfect credibility and robustness on policymaking.
Although there are six shocks in the model, in our analysis here we focus on the e¤ects of
shocks to the price markup and to aggregate technology. In light of its policy objectives,
the central bank always o¤sets the e¤ects of the shock to the neutral interest rate, and the
qualitative story that emerges regarding the e¤ects of robustness and imperfect credibility on
policymaking is consistent across the other three shocks.
6.1 The e¤ects of imperfect credibility and robustness on the response to
price-markup shocks
For a range of assumptions about credibility, Figure 2 displays the responses of ination, the
output gap, and the nominal interest rate to a one-standard-deviation price-markup shock.
We focus on two types of impulse responses. The rst type of impulse responses we denote
as within regime responses. These responses are equivalent to the Type I responses of
Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007); they are constructed under the assumption that todays
policymaker remains the decisionmaker in all future periods and characterize the responses
within a policymakers tenure. Following Bodenstein, Hebden, and Nunes (2010) these re-
sponses can be interpreted as the forward-guidance released by the central bank, here released
in the form of a state-contingent forecast that is conditioned upon a specic shock and upon
ongoing tenure. The second type of impulse responses we denote as expected responses.
These responses are equivalent to the Type III responses of Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007)
and they characterize the responses taking into account the fact that the tenure of todays
policymaker will stochastically terminate.3
The panels in the left-most column of Figure 2 (panels A, D, and G), show the (nonrobust)
expected responses under commitment4 and discretion and the within-regime and expected
responses under imperfect credibility ( = 0:75). In response to the price markup shock,
3Thus, where the Type I responses are conditioned upon a specic future sequence fs = 1g1s=t+1 , the Type
III responses take all possible future sequences into account.
4Of course, for a central bank that can commit the announced responses and the expected responses coincide.
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ination rises (panel A) and a negative output gap opens up (Panel D). The negative output
gap is somewhat larger when policy is conducted under commitment than under discretion,
a consequence of the discretionary stabilization bias, which leads the discretionary policy-
maker to ine¢ ciently trade-o¤ movements in the output gap and ination. Looking now at
the equilibrium responses according to the within regime policy, with  = 0:75 the central
bank announces a policy rule that implies that while its tenure continues it will implement
a policy that tightens less rapidly (Panel G), but keeps interest rates higher for longer than
the commitment policy. Thus, in order to stabilize ination the imperfectly credible central
bank attempts to leverage the credibility it has by announcing that it will implements a policy
during its tenure that is tighter for longer than the commitment policy. This result is con-
sistent with Bodenstein, Hebden, and Nunes (2010), who also found that imperfectly credible
central banks seek to leverage their credibility by making more extreme within-regime pol-
icy announcements. Interestingly, the expected policy looks qualitatively and quantitatively
much more like the discretionary policy than the commitment policy, with the shock leading
to a permanent increase in the price level.
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Figure 2. Responses to a 1-s.d. price-markup shock (=0.25)
Having seen how imperfect credibility drives a wedge between the within regime responses
and the expected responses, we now investigate in more detail the e¤ects that imperfect
credibility has on the within-regime policy. To this end, the panels in the middle column
of Figure 2 (panels B, E, and H) display, for varying values of , the within-regime policy
responses following a one-standard deviation price markup shock. When  = 1, and the
central bank is perfectly credible, the impact e¤ect of the markup shock is to raise ination
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(panel B) and lower the output gap (panel E). Because the central bank is committed to
returning ination to target (here the ination target is a rate of zero), the commitment policy
anchors long-run ination expectations rmly on the target. With ination expectations
anchored on the target, monetary policy in the short-run can be directed at stabilizing the
output gap. According to the commitment policy, the central bank raises interest rates in the
short-run (panel H) while promising to subsequently lower rates as ination declines. When
 = 0, and the central bank has no credibility, the within-regime responses are extreme,
but are implemented with zero-probability. When the central bank has imperfect credibility
the announced within-regime responses suggest an extreme tightening of policy, much like
discretionary behavior, except when  is close to one.
Lastly, the panels in the third column of Figure 2 (panels C, F, and I) illustrate the e¤ect
that the central banks concern for robustness has on its within-regime responses. With
the robustness parameter, , chosen such that ! = !, the main results that emerge are the
following. First, for this model robustness has only very small e¤ects on the within-regime
responses. The e¤ects of credibility on policy are quantitatively much more important than
those of robustness. Second, the within-regime responses associated with a perfectly-credible
central bank are essentially una¤ected by the central banks desire for robustness.
6.2 The e¤ects of imperfect credibility and robustness on the response to
technology shocks
Figure 3 displays the responses of ination, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate to a
one-standard-deviation aggregate-technology shock. Although the model, obviously, behaves
quite di¤erently following aggregate technology shocks than it does following price-markup
shocks, the conclusions regarding the qualitative e¤ects of imperfect credibility and robustness
are similar. Looking that the responses associated with the perfectly credible central bank
( = 1), because a rise in aggregate technology allows more goods to be produced from a
given set of inputs the e¤ects of the shock are to raise output and lower ination (panel A).
Because the central banks policy objective function assigns a large relative weight to stabilizing
ination (recall,  = 0:25), the e¤ect of the technology shock on monetary policy is to lower
the nominal interest rate (panel G). With the nominal interest rate declining more that one-
for-one with ination, the real interest rate declines and this stimulates aggregate demand,
opening up a positive output gap (panel D) and creating upward pressure on ination. As
ination rises, monetary policy begins to tighten and the positive output gap begins to close.
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The panels in the left-most column of Figure 3 (panels A, D, and G) reveal that the
imperfectly credible central bank ( = 0:75) responds to the shock with a within-regime policy
that is more extreme than that of the perfectly-credible central bank. Indeed, the imperfectly
credible central bank sees ination systematically below target and announces a policy path
that has low interest rates for a considerable period. At the same time, the responses to
the technology shock are all relatively small, a consequence of the fact that with a policy
objective directed at stabilizing the economy about its ex-price equilibrium, policy largely
accommodates shocks to technology. The panels in the middle column of Figure 3 (panels B,
E, and H) show that changes in credibility have relatively muted e¤ects on both ination and
the output gap while having larger e¤ects on the within-regime path for the interest rate. The
panels in the third column of Figure 3 (panels C, F, and I) further highlight that the central
banks desire for robustness has negligible e¤ect on the within-regime responses associated
with a perfectly-credible central bank, while having a larger, but still small, e¤ect on the
within-regime policy pursued by the discretionary central bank.
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Figure 3. Responses to a 1-s.d. aggregate technology shock (=0.25)
6.3 Is robustness a substitute for credibility?
It is well-known that commitment is superior to discretion and that higher credibility leads to
better economic outcomes when the model is correctly specied. However, when the central
bank has doubts about its model and implements a policy that robust in the Hansen-Sargent
sense, then the models equilibrium with robust policy (the approximating equilibrium) will
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di¤er from the models equilibrium with nonrobust policy (the rational expectations equilib-
rium). This raises the question of whether the central banks desire for robustness produces
an improvement or a deterioration in policy performance when the central bank has imperfect
credibility. Is the policy performance, measured according to the policy objective function
(equation 27), associated with the robust policy higher or lower than that associated with the
nonrobust policy and how is the relative performance of these two policies a¤ected by credi-
bility? The analysis in this section relates to Dennis (2010) who used a stylized medium-scale
New Keynesian DSGE model to show that a central banks desire for robustness could, in
principle, lead to improved outcomes when policy is conducted under discretion. Here we
expand on Dennis (2010) by examining this issue in the Smets and Wouters model and by
considering imperfect credibility rather than just discretion.
For the Smets and Wouters (2007) model, Figure 4 examines the relationship between
relative policy performance and robustness, , for varying levels of credibility, . If robust-loss
relative to nonrobust-loss (V qc (; ) =V qc (;1)) is greater than one, then robustness leads to
a deterioration in policy performance. Alternatively, if robust-loss relative to nonrobust-loss
is less than one, then robustness leads to an improvement in policy performance.
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Figure 4. The e¤ectiveness of robustness as a substitute for credibility (=0.25)
With higher values of  associated with less concern for model misspecication, and with
policy performance for a given  measured relative to the benchmark in which the model is
known to be correctly specied, relative policy performance (V qc (; ) =V qc (;1)) converges
to one as  rises to innity for all levels of credibility. Figure 4 shows that whether the
equilibrium outcomes associated with the approximating equilibrium are superior or inferior
to those associated with the nonrobust equilibrium depends on whether the central bank
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can commit. When credibility is perfect ( = 1) the central banks desire for robustness
leads to a slight decline in relative policy performance. Similarly, when the central bank
has zero-credibility ( = 0) the central banks desire for robustness improves relative policy
performance. Each of these ndings is consistent with Dennis (2010), and establishes for
the Smets and Wouters (2007) model that a central banks desire for robustness can serve
somewhat like a commitment mechanism even when policy is conducted under discretion. In
addition, Figure 4 shows that a desire for robustness can act as a substitute for credibility
and improve relative policy performance for most levels of credibility, and not just for pure
discretion ( = 0). Indeed, only when credibility is very high close to perfect does the
central banks desire for robustness ever worsen policy performance.
6.4 How detectable are the specication errors?
Our analysis of robust policymaking has assumed that the robustness parameter, , equals the
threshold value, . This assumption expresses the idea that the central bank is as concerned as
it can be about the approximating model while still holding the view that the approximating
model is a useful approximation of the actual data-generating process. A consequence of this
assumption is that the e¤ects of robustness on the impulse responses shown in Figures 2 and 3
cannot be made more damaging through a di¤erent and more pessimistic choice of . The
fact that the e¤ects of model misspecication appear small even with  =  may well imply
that the Smets and Wouters (2007) model can be destabilized by relatively small specication
errors, even under a robust policy rule. Such a result would not be unexpected because it
has been shown elsewhere that the performance of optimal policy rules, which exploit fully
a models structure, can be very poor when that structure is incorrect (Levin, Wieland, and
Williams, 2003), providing a popular argument for the use of optimized simple rules, which
exploit less structure (McCallum, 1988). With these issues in mind, here we ask the question
of whether the central bank is likely to be able to detect the specication errors and how their
detection is a¤ected by imperfect credibility.
To explore this question we employ the notion of a detection-error probability that is
promoted in a series of papers by Hansen and Sargent (see, for example, Anderson, Hansen,
and Sargent, 2003). A detection-error probability is the probability that an econometri-
cian observing equilibrium outcomes would make an incorrect inference about whether the
approximating equilibrium or the worst-case equilibrium generated the data. The intuitive
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connection between  and the probability of making a detection error is that when  is small,
greater di¤erences between the distorted model and the approximating model (more severe
misspecications) can arise, which are more easily detected. In its top panel, Figure 5 displays
the relationship between the (log of the) robustness parameter  and the probability of mak-
ing a detection error for discretion ( = 0:00), perfect credibility ( = 1:00), and imperfect
credibility ( = 0:50). In its bottom panel, Figure 5 displays the relationship between the
robustness parameter, , and the distortion budget, !, calculated according to equation (8).
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Figure 5. The relationship between detectability, the distortion budget, and credibility
(=0.25)
The following main results emerge from Figure 5. First, the detection error probabilities
and the distortions budgets associated with imperfect credibility are very similar to those for
discretion, except when  is close to one. Second, although the detection error probabilities
are similar at the breakdown points, ! = ! (), these breakdown points are associated with
very di¤erent distortion budgets. In particular, the distortion budget for  = 1 is the smallest
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of those considered, suggesting that commitment policies are indeed more susceptible to model
misspecication. Together the two panels in Figure 5 suggest that the commitment policy
is more fragile than the quasi-commitment policies, breaking down with smaller specication
errors, that the quasi-commitment policies behave similarly to the discretionary policy, and
that the distortion budget is larger under discretion, which is consistent with the robustness
results in Figures 2 and 3.
6.5 The e¤ect of a greater weight on output stabilization
The results above were obtained under the maintained assumption that the relative weight
assigned to output stabilization in the policy objective function is  = 0:25. To assess
whether our results are qualitatively sensitive to this assumed value for  we repeated the
analysis, but under the maintained assumption that  = 4:00, i.e., that the weight assigned to
output stabilization is four times the weight assigned to ination stabilization. Although the
nature of the impulse response functions do change, simply reecting the greater importance
that the central bank places on output stabilization, the qualitative results do not change.
With the robustness parameter set to its threshold value, the e¤ects of robustness on the
impulse response functions is relatively small, considerably smaller than the e¤ects of imperfect
credibility. Further, the central banks lack of credibility continues to motivate it to leverage
what credibility it has by seeking to implement a within-regime policy response that is more
extreme than that associated with perfect credibility. In addition, the central banks desire
for robustness continues to generate improved policy performance, except when credibility is
close to perfect.
7 Conclusion
This paper has considered the decision problem facing an imperfectly credible central bank
that seeks to conduct monetary policy using a model whose structure it has doubts about.
Motivating this study is the increased use by central banks of policy announcements in the
form of model-based forecast-contingent forward-guidance about future policy. In this paper,
the central banks doubts about its model are modeled via the robust control literature, giving
rise to a maxmin problem as per Hansen and Sargent (2008), while imperfect credibility is
modeled according to the quasi-commitment literature. The resulting decision problem allows
us to study separately, and in combination, the e¤ects that robustness and imperfect credibility
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have on central bank behavior and economic outcomes. Usefully, this decision problem accom-
modates commitment, discretion, quasi-commitment, robust control, and nonrobust control
as special cases.
With the Smets and Wouters (2007) model providing the laboratory, our examination of
robust policymaking with imperfect credibility o¤ers the following main ndings. First, a
central banks credibility gives it a powerful lever for managing private-sector expectations
and for stabilizing the economy. The importance of credibility for outcomes is manifest in the
magnitude of the discretionary stabilization bias and in the nding that short average regime
durations leave most of the gap between the discretionary policy and the commitment policy
unclosed. Related to these ndings, in contrast to Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), we
nd that even relatively small departures from perfect credibility produce big declines in policy
performance, giving rise to a form of discretionary stabilization bias. Second, consistent with
Bodenstein, Hebden, and Nunes (2010), a consequence of imperfect credibility is that it can
give a central bank an incentive to issue what may appear to be an extreme within-regime
policy response in an e¤ort to leverage what credibility it has. Third, to the extent that
robustness is important for how policy responds to shocks, it appears to be more important
for low-credibility central banks. In particular, a low-credibility central bank can benet from
a desire for robustness with this desire acting somewhat as a substitute for credibility.
A Appendix: Risk-sensitive preferences and robust control
with quasi-commitment
We showed in Section 3 that the solution to the robust-control problem under discretion could
equivalently be obtained from a formulation with risk-sensitive preferences. In this appendix
we extend that result to establish a risk-sensitive formulation that is equivalent to the robust-
control decision problem with quasi-commitment. One simplifying assumption that we make
is that A0 has full rank. Without loss of generality, then, we assume that A0 = I. With
this assumption, and assuming  2 (0; 1] (ruling out the discretionary case), the constraints
according to the approximating model can be written as
zt+1 = Azt + But + C"xt+1; (A1)
while those according to the distorted model can be written as
zt+1 = Azt + But + C (vt+1 + "xt+1) ; (A2)
where zt =

x
0
t y
0
t
0
. To show the connection between the robust-control problem and the
risk-sensitive preferences problem it is convenient to utilize the solution strategy of Backus
and Dri¢ ll (1986) which begins by treating zt, which contains nonpredetermined variables, as
the state vector. Accordingly, the risk-sensitive preferences formulation takes the form
z
0
tPzt + p = minut

L (zt;ut)  1

ln

Et

exp



z
0
t+1
ePzt+1 + p ; (A3)
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where   0, eP = P + (1  ) S0S0 1PS 1S;
with S =

I 0

, and the constraints are given by equation (A1). Employing Jacobson
(1973), equation (A3) can be expressed as
z
0
tPzt + p = minut
h
L (zt;ut) + Et

z
0
t+1D
eP zt+1 + bpi ; (A4)
where
D
eP = eP  ePCI + C0 ePC 1C0 eP:
In contrast, the robust control formulation of the decision problem is
z
0
tPzt + p = minut
max
vt+1
h
L (zt;ut)  v0t+1vt+1 + Et

z
0
t+1
ePzt+1 + pi ; (A5)
where   0 and the constraints are given by equation (A2). Performing the inner maximiza-
tion yields
vt+1 = Et
"
1


I  1

C
0 ePC 1C0 ePzt+1# : (A6)
Substituting equations (A6) and (A2) back into equation (A5) gives
z
0
tPzt+p = minut
"
L (zt;ut) + Et
 
z
0
t+1
"eP+1

ePCI  1

C
0 ePC 1C0 eP# zt+1 + p!# ; (A7)
where the constraints are now given by the approximating mode, equation (A1).
With  =   1 the solutions to equations (A4) and (A7) lead to the same decision rule
ut = Fzt:
Following Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986) the next step is to transform the solution from one
depending on predetermined and nonpredetermined variables to one depending on predeter-
mined and costate variables, where the latter are the analogue of the multipliers t 1 in the
text. Accordingly, let
t 1 = P21xt + P22yt;
where P21 and P22 are submatrices of P. Then the solution has
H =  P 122 P21;
C2 =  P 122 P21C1: (A8)
Note that substituting equation (A8) into equation (A6) leads to
vt+1 = Et
"
1


I  1

C
0
1

P11  P021P 122 P21

C1
 1
C
0
1

P11  P021P 122 P21

xt+1
#
;
which further establishes that the worst-case specication errors depend only on the the ex-
pected future predetermined variables (Dennis, 2008).
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B Appendix: Detection-error probability
Let A denote the approximating model and B denote the worst-case model; then, assigning
equal prior weight to each model and assuming that model selection is based on the likelihood
ratio principle, Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002) show that detection-error probabilities are
calculated according to
p () =
prob (AjB) + prob(BjA)
2
;
where prob(AjB) (prob(BjA)) represents the probability that the econometrician erroneously
chooses A (B) when B (A) generated the data. Let fzBt gT1 denote a nite sequence of economic
outcomes (the shocks, the shadow prices, the endogenous variables, and the followers and
leaders decision variables) generated by the worst-case equilibrium, and let LAB and LBB
denote the likelihood associated with models A and B, respectively; then the econometrician
chooses A over B if log(LBB=LAB) < 0. Generating M independent sequences fzBt gT1 ,
prob (AjB) can be calculated according to
prob (AjB)  1
M
MX
m=1
I

log

LmBB
LmAB

< 0

;
where I[log (LmBB=L
m
AB) < 0] is the indicator function that equals one when its argument is
satised and equals zero otherwise; prob(BjA) is calculated analogously using data generated
from the approximating model.
Let
zt+1 = HAzt + G"t+1
zt+1 = HBzt + G"t+1
govern equilibrium outcomes under the approximating equilibrium and the worst-case equilib-
rium, respectively. Using the Moore-Penrose inverse,
b"ijjt+1 = G0G 1G0 zjt+1  Hizjt ; fi; jg 2 fA;Bg
are the inferred innovations in period t + 1 when model i is tted to data fzjtgT1 generated
from model j, and let bijj be the associated estimates of the innovation variance-covariance
matrices. Note that the Moore-Penrose inverse picks out the shock process from among the
variables in zt.
Assuming that the innovations are normally distributed, it is easy to show that
log

LAA
LBA

=
1
2
tr
bBjA   bAjA
log

LBB
LAB

=
1
2
tr
bAjB   bBjB :
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